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Business management reform efforts have been part of the U.S. Defense
Department agenda for decades. Current reform efforts have explicitly
established the goal of generating, harvesting, and reinvesting savings from
business management reform to buy more capital items; that is, they have
focused on a measurable reallocation from operating and support costs to
investment within a given budget top line. Recent increases in the defense top
line, largely related to the war on terrorism, are not likely to persist; in addition,
an examination of the factors affecting the top line suggests that a decline in the
near term is likely. An examination of current and past defense management
reforms suggests that efficiency-seeking business management reforms are not
likely to generate sufficient resources to cover a budget decline. Instead,
management reform should be sustained for reasons of stewardship and
accountability.
INTRODUCTION
After six years of increasing budgets and an active defense management reform agenda in
the G. W. Bush administration, it now appears that defense budgets may be headed for a
decline and the future role of management reform initiatives may be uncertain. Internal
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pressures from rising costs for manpower, health care, acquisition, and operations and
maintenance are constraining discretionary spending inside the defense budget. Despite
significant increases in defense spending, resource allocation decisions have favored
operating expenses over capital investments. External pressures from the budget deficit,
rising costs for entitlement programs, pressure from other discretionary programs in the
federal budget, and public opinion regarding defense activities suggest that the total
resources allocated for defense will be further constrained in the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the individual service components
have been looking toward major management reform initiatives as a means to save and
reinvest budgetary resources.
This paper addresses both sides of the issue raised in the title: is the defense budget
expected to decline and, if so, what are the implications for defense management
reforms? What are the prospects for sustaining management reform in a time of declining
budgets?
WILL THE DOD BUDGET TOP LINE DECLINE?
When one considers whether the DoD budget top line will rise or fall, there are historical
patterns that should be considered and internal and external factors that affect those
patterns. First, however, one must define the top line. If one defines the top line in
absolute terms, budget authority and outlays are the common definitions. Both of these
may also be defined temporally, as the request in the annual president’s budget, or as the
authority granted by congress in an appropriation, or as the final expended amount.
One may also define the defense top line in relative terms. One version of a relative
measure is the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (%GDP) spent on defense. This is
a widely used measure, but often a misused one. It is useful when comparing the defense
spending of different countries as it normalizes the level of spending in terms relative to
the size of the nations’ economies. It is misused when the denominator effect is
ignoredFan economy that grows faster than defense spending suggests a decline in
defense capability when, in fact, that capability may be rising. A second relative measure
is the percentage of total federal outlays (%Outlays). This measure indicates the relative
importance of defense spending in terms of spending for all the other activities of the
federal government. If government is what government spends, then a decrease in
%Outlays for defense indicates a shift in governmental priorities away from defense and
toward other functions. This measure also suffers from a denominator effect. Defense
spending could fall in %Outlays while still rising in absolute terms if the aggregate rate of
growth in all other government programs is higher than in defense.
Figure 1 displays three measures of the defense top line over the period 1940–2011.
Since World War II (WWII), in absolute terms, defense outlays appear as a cyclical
pattern with a lower limit of about $350 billion and an upper limit of about $550 billion
in constant FY2006 dollars. The cycles are fairly consistent, with a wavelength ranging
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from 15 to 21 years and averaging 17 years. Fiscal Year 2007 is 18 years since the last
peak in 1989, suggesting that if the long-term pattern repeats, defense will face declining
absolute top lines beginning within the next few years and continuing for seven to 10
years.
If one instead uses relative terms for defense spending, since WWII, defense spending
as a %GDP has fallen rather steadily from a peak of 14.2 percent in 1952 to a low of 3
percent in 1999–2000. In 2006, defense spending stood at about 4.1 percent of GDP,
which was one-third more than just a few years back, but one-fourth of what was spent
in the 1950s. Defense spending as a percentage of federal outlays has also declined
significantly, from a peak of 69.5 percent in 1954 (the last year of the Korean War) to a
low of 16.1 percent in 1999. In 2006, defense was 19.8 percent of federal outlays.1
Today, approximately one-fifth of federal government spending is for national
defense, and four-fifths are for other functions of government. In the 1950s, two-thirds of
government spending was defense. Should the long-term trends continue, defense can
expect declining relative top lines.
Simply identifying the trends of the last 50 years does not mean that those trends will
apply to the next three to five years. We do not have the knowledge to make a point







































































1. Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government for
Fiscal Year 2008 (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 2007).
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affect the top lineFfactors both external and internal to the department. External
factors are associated with federal fiscal policy and political dynamics.
External Factors
Deficits. As of 2006, the United States had experienced four consecutive years of budget
deficits following four consecutive years of budget surpluses. The Bush administration’s
position is that it will eliminate the deficit by 2012.2 When an administration or Congress
wishes to reduce a deficit, generally it requires a combination of increasing revenues and
decreasing outlays. If defense maintains even a steady proportion of federal spending
during an overall decline, it will lose top line.3 But the correlation between defense spending
and deficits may be even more closely linked.
Figure 2 plots budget deficits against defense spending from 1979 to 2006. It is readily
apparent that as defense spending increased, deficits increased; as spending on defense
declined, deficits fell to the point of achieving surpluses. Statistically, the correlation is a
rather strong  0.64. Of course, correlation is not the same as causality. Defense spending
Defense Spending vs Budget Deficit (Surplus), 1979-2006
in constant 2006 dollars

















































2. George W. Bush, The Budget Message of the President, Budget of the United States Government for
Fiscal Year 2008 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007.)
3. Of course, if growth is kept below the rate of inflation, there could be deficit reduction with a nominal
increase in the top line.
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does not necessarily cause deficits; rather, each could be affected by a third factor such as
an unstable international situation. Levels of defense spending, as the figure suggests, are
not necessarily driven by macroeconomic conditions. A larger military does not result
because it is affordable; a larger military results because it is deemed necessary for the
security of the state. In fact, the cause–effect relationship is often in the other direction.
Financing of military expansion has historically been carried out in a manner that requires
consideration of its effect on the economy.4 However, the apparent relationship between
defense spending and deficits suggests that balanced budget policies may exert pressure on
the defense top line.
Mandatory Programs. Defense spending has declined from two-fifths of federal
spending to one-fifth in the past 40 years, supplanted by mandatory spending; see Figure
3. From 1966 to 2006, interest on the debt and ‘‘all other spending’’ accounted for roughly
the same proportion of federal spending: about 41 percent. The remaining 59 percent was
largely defense spending in 1966; at the time, defense spending was three times more than
Social Security spending. In the intervening 40 years, the proportion of federal spending on
defense was reduced more than 50 percent while Social Security increased by 40 percent.
Health programs, new in 1966, represent nearly as much as defense in 2006.5


































4. Robert D. Hormats, The Price of Liberty: Paying for America’s Wars (New York: Henry Holt, 2007).
5. Government Accountability Office, Saving Our Future Requires Tough Choices Today: Fiscal Wake
Up Tour (GAO-527CG) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2007). Concerning health care, if one allocates the
health-related programs from defense and ‘‘all other spending’’ and adds them to the Medicare and
Medicaid wedge, the total health-care portion grows to about 25 percent and defense declines to about 19
percent. See Table 16.1 of the Historical Tables that accompany the federal budget for fiscal year 2008.
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The Congressional Budget Office estimates that this shift will continue. They estimate
that in 2016, the mandatory programs will cost $1,274 billion more than in 2006, a total of
$2,793 billion.6 This is more than all the projected federal outlays, mandatory and
discretionary, in 2007. The CBO projects that in the period from 2008 to 2017,
discretionary budget authority will increase at 2.0 percent per annum, relative to GDP
growth of 4.5 percent, while mandatory spending will grow at 5.9 percent.7
Nondefense Discretionary Spending. Defense top lines not only feel pressure from
growing entitlement programs, but may also face pressure from other discretionary
programs. From 1985 to 2006, total discretionary outlays as a percentage of GDP declined
from 10.0 to 7.8 percent. Of those 2.2 percentage points, defense spending accounted for
2.1 and other discretionary spending accounted for 0.1.8 Nearly, the entire reduction in
discretionary spending was absorbed by defense. The last few years of that history tell a
different story, however. From 2001 to 2006, total discretionary outlays as a percentage of
GDP increased from 6.3 to 7.8 percent. Of that 1.5 percentage point increase, defense
accounted for 1.0 point and nondefense accounted for 0.5.9
Democratization of Defense Spending. How responsive are Washington decision makers
to the demands of the public? The evidence strongly suggests that if the general public
believes that defense spending is too high, defense spending declines and vice versa. Studies
conducted at the end of the Cold War demonstrated empirically that the desires of the
public are reflected in future spending decisions.10
Updating that research, Figure 4 displays the relationship between the direction and
strength of public opinion about defense spending and subsequent changes in the
proportion of federal outlays on defense. In a series of public opinion polls in which
respondents were asked whether they thought that the United States spent too much, about
the right amount, or too little on defense, the bars in the figure represent the difference
between those who responded ‘‘too much’’ and those who responded ‘‘too little.’’11 A
downward-oriented bar represents more support for a declining defense budget than a
rising one; the height of the bar represents the strength of that opinion. The line in the
figure represents the percentage change in the subsequent year’s defense spending
(%Outlays) compared with the year during which the polling occurred. Statistically, the
change in defense spending correlates strongly with the direction and strength of public
opinion. When public opinion favors increased defense spending, spending has tended to
go up the following year; when the public favors a decrease, spending tends to decline the
6. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2007–2016
(Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2006).
7. Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008–2017
(Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2007).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, ‘‘Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs
Military Spending in the United States?’’, The American Political Science Review 86, no. 4 (1992): 905–915;
and Robert Higgs and Anthony Kilduff, ‘‘Public Opinion: A Powerful Predictor of U.S. Defense
Spending,’’ Defense Economics 4 (1993): 227–238.
11. Tom W. Smith, Trends in National Spending Priorities, 1973F2006 (Chicago: National Opinion
Research Center, 2007).
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following year. In combination with the data in Figure 1, one might conclude that the
public has a ‘‘comfort zone’’ of appropriate defense spending that ranges between $350
billion and $550 billion (FY2006 dollars). One should note that defense spending for FY08
is projected to be above that zone at $593 billion (FY2006 dollars).
What does the public currently believe about defense spending? The polling data used in
Figure 4 indicate that in 2006, 39.4 percent of Americans favored reduced defense spending
compared with 26.8 percent who favored an increase.12 An extensive survey conducted in
2005 by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of
Maryland corroborates Smith’s findings.13
National Politics. Defense-spending levels do not correlate to the political party of the
president or the congressional majority. However, the return to divided government after
the 2006 midterm elections, the debate over the fiscal year 2007 Iraq war supplemental
appropriation, and the dynamics of the 2008 presidential campaign to date indicate higher
levels of scrutiny and debate over defense spending options. Since the 2006 election, the
new Democratic majority in Congress has focused on using the power of the purse to force
Democratization of Defense Spending, 1973-2006
Direction and strength of public opinion vs change in defense outlays one year later

























































































































13. PIPA, The Federal Budget: The Public’s Priorities. The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, 2005.
Report online; available from: http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/DefenseSpending/FedBudget_Mar05/
FedBudget_Mar05_rpt.pdf: accessed 6 April 2007.
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policy changes and reduce involvement in Iraq. They appear, however, to distinguish
between the war in Iraq and the overall effort to combat terrorism. While seeking to reduce
funding for operations in Iraq, the Democrats have shown less inclination to reduce overall
defense spending. Looking toward the 2008 elections, notwithstanding a difference on war
funding, neither party seems to be advocating large-scale defense budget cuts in the near
term. Both undoubtedly recognize the looming costs of reconstituting the force after Iraq
and neither may wish to be portrayed as stingy on defense. However, there is a range of
thought on these issues among the candidates in both parties. It is certainly possible that
different candidates, if elected, might approach shaping the defense budget in different
ways, to support their view of current and future defense strategies and in consideration of
defense domestic-spending priorities.
To summarize, there has been fiscal pressure on the defense top line from growth in
mandatory spending accounts and nondefense discretionary accounts. The United States is
again at a time when deficits are a point of concern. Politically, the administration faces
increased congressional scrutiny over and opposition to military policies, and public
support of defense spending is waning. Time will tell how that manifests in spending
decisions. Such external factors are vital when considering current defense management
reform but internal factors may be more important.
Internal Factors
Internal factors affecting defense spending are those which defense leaders are more able
to directly control and include budgeting and spending for acquisition, personnel, and
operation and maintenance. The policy of budgeting for the war separately also
confounds analysis of defense spending. Before looking at specific factors, let us adopt a
broad view. From the low point of the 1990s ‘‘procurement holiday’’ to today, the
Department of the Navy’s budget increased 46 percent in real terms, but the size of the
fleet declined from 354 battleforce ships to 280; aircraft inventory declined from 2,559 to
2,330; and the number of personnel (uniformed and civilian) declined from 929,358 to
829,531.14 While spending increased by half, the naval forces are 15 percent smaller. The
last time defense experienced 12 continuous years of budget growth was 1979–1990
during which time the fleet grew from 530 to 587 ships.
To sustain the Navy’s current goal of a 313 ship navy, there needs to be sufficient
shipbuilding budget authority to consistently build an average of 11 ships a year. Since
1998, navy five-year budgets have planned to build eight ships per year but have
succeeded in building only six ships per year. To get to 12 will require nearly doubling the
annual shipbuilding budget, currently at $11 billion.15 Can management reform efforts
generate approximately $10 billion from the other accounts?
14. Department of the Navy, Budget Highlights, Editions for Fiscal Years 1998–2008, Washington, DC,
2007; available from: http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/08pres/books.htm: accessed 13 February 2007.
15. Congressional Research Service, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress (Report RL32665) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006).
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 Acquisition costs. The department’s appetite for major acquisition programs and
the cost performance of those programs continue to be important issues. The Joint
Strike Fighter, F-22, the Army Future Combat System, the Air Force’s
Transformational Satellite System, the Navy’s DD-1000, and Virginia-class
submarine programs have all experienced significant cost growth, quantity
reductions, and schedule slips.16 In early 2007, the Navy acquisition executive
issued a stop work order for the Littoral Combat ship when the first ship in the
class experienced costs 50 percent over budget. Two decades of acquisition
management reform have not significantly improved program management
practices. Annual budgeting horizons favor short-term decisions at the expense
of long-term planning horizons. Costs rise and schedules slow, pushing up against
the top line without resulting in more capability.17
 Personnel costs. Pay and benefits for personnel have increased in recent years at the
same time accrual accounting changes have illuminated costs, such as the accrued
costs of retiree heath care, which have always been there, but were not explicitly
recognized. The activation of tens of thousands of reservists and guardsmen for
the Iraq war resulted in increased long-term liabilities because their benefits
packages have been expanded. Figure 5 plots Department of the Navy spending
from 1997 to 2008 on pay, allowances, and family housing against the total
number of active and reserve navy and marines. In constant dollars, the cost per
troop has increased 47 percent. In an effort to hold outlays constant, the policy has
been to reduce the size of the force.
 Operations and maintenance costs. Operations and maintenance costs have
increased significantly due to the Global War on Terrorism. The war’s toll on
equipment will further drive up O&M requirements for the next few years,
particularly in depot maintenance.18 These numbers, however, are not clearly
reflected in the budget. The FY2008/2009 defense budget, like all defense budgets
since 9/11, was tallied and submitted separately from the wartime supplemental
budget. Because of this practice, for example, the baseline budget for Marine
Corps depot maintenance19 shows a decrease in activity from $372 million in 2006
to $71 million in 2008.20 Separately, the Marine Corps requested an FY2008
supplemental appropriation of $490.6 million for this account. If one has the
16. Congressional Research Service, Defense Budget: Long-Term Challenges for FY2006 and Beyond
(Report RL32877) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005).
17. Ronald Kadish et al., Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report for the Deputy Secretary
of Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006).
18. Government Accountability Office, Global War on Terrorism: Observations on Funding, Costs and
Future Commitments, Report GAO-06-885T (Washington, DC: GAO, 2006).
19. Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps, Budget Activity 1A3A.
20. Department of the Navy, Fiscal Year 2008/2009 Budget Estimates, Justification of Estimates,
Operation &Maintenance, Marine Corps, 2007; available from: http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/08pres/
ops/OMMC_Book.pdf: accessed 13 February 2007.
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wherewithal to marry the two, they will see that depot maintenance is actually
projected to increase from $372 million to $562 million, not decrease. Program and
budget analysts, in an attempt to separate a ‘‘peacetime’’ baseline budget from the
cost of war, now produce twice the number of documents (leading to twice the
legislation and twice the number of accounts to manage), none of which
individually accurately portrays the true level of activity.
 Other supplemental appropriation issues. The wartime supplemental appropriations
confound analysis of defense spending further. When the Navy submitted its
FY2008 budget, it announced cuts in the acquisition of aircraft,21 but replaced a
large number of those aircraft in the supplemental request. For example, nine H-1
helicopters were cut from the base, but requested in the supplemental, eight H-60
helicopters were cut from the base, but nine were requested in the supplemental,
four V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft were cut from the base, and three were requested in the
supplemental (despite the fact the V-22 has not been used in the war).22 These
practices will cause distortions in future baseline budgets that may negatively
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FIGURE5
21. Christopher J. Castelli, Navy Cuts Aviation Accounts, Budgets for Seven Ships in 2008; available
from: InsideDefense.com: accessed 5 February 2007.
22. Navy, Budget Highlights.
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affect future DoD budgets after the use of supplemental appropriations ceases
unless some type of ‘‘recapture’’ takes place.
Summary
Will the defense top line rise or fall over the next few years? Long-term historical trends
suggest that by all measures (%GDP, %Outlays, and constant dollars), defense spending
is likely to fall. If one takes into consideration both external and internal factors in the
near term, we also see evidence of downward pressure. External factors related to fiscal
policy such as deficits, growing entitlement programs, and growing discretionary
programs all restrict the room for growth in the defense budget. The Democratic
leadership in Congress and the direction and strength of public opinion push down on
(or at least more closely scrutinize) defense spending. Internal factors push for a higher
topline, but include significant inflationary effects and so top line increases will buy
relatively less capability. Supplemental appropriations for the war are likely to continue
and provide an opportunity for the defense department to seek relief from budget
pressures in other ways; however, their use distorts data used in budgeting for the future.
The administration requested a significant defense budget increase in FY2008, 11 percent
more than in FY2007, but the DoD is already exhibiting signs of fiscal stress. No one can
say for certain what will happen in the future, but it appears that the defense budget is
under increased pressure from many sources and is under increased scrutiny.
DEFENSE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT REFORM
How does this budget situation relate to business management reform within the DoD?
At best, business management reform in DoD can only address the internal factors
pushing against the budgetary top line. A review of the recent history of defense business
management reform and an examination of the current management reform agenda
suggest some implications for managing in a time of budget reductions.
Recent History of Defense Business Management Reform
The idea of reforming the business practices of defense to achieve savings is not new. The
current era of defense management reform has its origins in the Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management (the ‘‘Packard Commission’’) established in
1985 by President Reagan to examine certain defense management policies and
procedures. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci prepared the Defense Management
Report (DMR) for the president based on the management reforms recommended by the
Packard Commission and the DMR formed the basis for the management reform agenda
of Defense Secretary Cheney in the Bush (41) administration. Differing from short-term
budget reductions, the purpose of these reforms was to save money long term through
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streamlined management practices and efficiency measures. The imperative for these
reforms came from competing national priorities and the decline of financial resources
available for national defense.23 DMR sought savings through consolidation of like
functions and improved cost management. For instance, finance and accounting were
centralized in the new Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), civilian
personnel management was centralized in the Civilian Personnel Management Service
(CPMS), and a consolidated revolving fund, the Defense Business Operating Fund
(DBOF), was created. Cheney reported that DMR efficiencies would result in savings
totaling $70 billion by FY 1997.24
The management reform agenda of the Clinton administration was derived from the
National Performance Review (NPR). Its goal was ‘‘to make the entire federal
government less expensive and more efficient . . . .’’25 The characteristics of reinvention
included information technology integration, cutting costs, streamlining processes,
improving customer service, and experimentation. During Secretary Aspin’s short tenure
as Secretary of Defense, there was a focus on cost reduction through dual-use
technology.26 During William Perry’s term as Secretary of Defense, themes of cost
reduction and ‘‘enhancing defense reform’’ were continued.27
In 1998, Defense Secretary William Cohen introduced a new approach to defense
management reformF‘‘Transformation for the 21st Century.’’ Cohen argued that DoD
management practices were far behind those found in the private sector. Cohen proposed
the Defense Reform Initiative, a ‘‘strategic blueprint,’’ to make the DoD ‘‘leaner and
more flexible in order to remain competitive.’’28 This plan proposed four major
initiatives:
 Re-engineer: Adopt modern business practices to achieve world-class standards of
performance.
 Consolidate: Streamline organizations to remove redundancy and maximize
synergy.
 Compete: Apply market mechanisms to improve quality, reduce costs, and respond
to customer needs.
23. Richard B. Cheney, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Defense, 1990).
24. Richard B. Cheney, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Defense, 1993).
25. William J. Clinton, Remarks by President Clinton Announcing Initiative to Streamline
Government; available from: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/speeches/030393.html: accessed 9
August 2006.
26. Les Aspin, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Defense, 1994).
27. William Perry, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Defense, 1995).
28. William Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Defense, 1998).
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 Eliminate: Reduce excess support structures to free resources and focus on core
competencies.29
Cohen’s Management Reform Memoranda proposed 17 reform measures to
streamline the infrastructure and ‘‘re-engineer’’ business processes in acquisition, educa-
tion, information sharing, transportation, travel, and facilities and property manage-
ment.30
Defense Management Reform in the Current Era
The George W. Bush administration also came to office with a management focus. The
President’s Management Agenda (PMA) addresses five areas targeted for management
reform throughout the federal government: human capital, improved financial manage-
ment, competitive sourcing, electronic government, and budget and performance
integration.31
In the DoD, an initial management objective was to ‘‘increase effectiveness through
increased accountability and efficiency’’32 with emphasis on cost reduction, improving
quality, reducing redundancies, and adopting best business practices. Secretary Rumsfeld
emphasized the creation and use of metrics to quantify performance improvements and
he sought to focus the Department’s resources on core functions.33 To improve its
efficiency, the DoD is tackling several significant challenges: cost reduction, organiza-
tional realignment, and cultural issues.34
The DoD has identified six major, strategic, high-leverage initiatives, called Business
Enterprise Priorities (BEPs). These BEPs address personnel, acquisitions, material,
finance, common supplier engagement, and real property accountability. Each BEP
‘‘details measurable program and business capability milestones over the next several
years. They provide enduring improvements to the department’s business infrastructure
[. . .] through integration of enterprise business processes, reducing systems redundancies,
and continuously improving financial transparency.’’35 The Business Enterprise
Architecture (BEA) ‘‘is the enterprise architecture for the Department of Defense’s
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Defense, 2003).
32. Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Defense, 2002).
33. Daniel B. Francis and Robin J. Walther, A Comparative History of Department of Defense
Management Reform from 1947 to 2005 (Monterey, CA: Center for Defense Management Reform Report
NPS-CDMR-GM-06-009, 2006).
34. David M. Walker, Fiscal Year 2004 Transitions and Transformations in the Federal Government,
2004; available from: http://www.gao.gov/cghome/dia/fy2004tt-dia.pdf: accessed 12 March 2007.
35. Defense Business Transformation Agency, Business Enterprise Priorities; available from: http://
www.defenselink.mil/dbt/priorities_beps.html: accessed 22 May 2007.
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business information infrastructure processes, data, standards, business rules, operating
requirements, and information exchanges.’’36 The BEA seeks to add uniformity to DoD
processes to ‘‘ensure accurate, reliable, timely and compliant information’’ and also to
streamline activities. DoD is using budget and performance indicators to support
performance-based budgeting and has used the balanced scorecard approach to measure
performance with resource management.37 The Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP) is to be
used by DoD components to ‘‘design and implement their own business transformation
solutions within a framework of transformational DoD business rules and standards.’’38
DoD has sought to institutionalize the oversight and management of its current reform
agenda. Oversight of defense business transformation is conducted by the Defense
Business Board, an advisory panel consisting of private-sector executives chartered to
provide ‘‘independent advice and recommendations on effective strategies for the
implementation of best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense.’’39
The Department’s Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) and Defense
Business Transformation Agency (DBTA) were created to institutionalize parts of the
DoD change program. DBTA’s strategic objectives include improving financial
stewardship, enabling rapid access to information, and reducing the costs of defense
business operations.40 The future of this governance structure for business management
transformation is uncertain, of course. Much of it is associated with the administration
of Donald Rumsfeld and may change as leadership in the department changes. Thus far,
Rumsfeld’s successor, Secretary Robert M. Gates, has had little to say publicly about
management, but Deputy Secretary Gordon England appears to be continuing his active
leadership of the department’s management reform agenda, as have the service
secretaries.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force have developed service-specific management reform
agendas as well.
 The Army’s goal is to instill a culture of continuous process improvement to
increase responsiveness, decrease cycle time, decrease inventories, and provide
enhanced support. Lean Six Sigma is the Army’s tool of choice to drive across-the-
board elimination of unnecessary or wasteful processes, the reduction of process
variability, and the improvement of quality.41 The tool is viewed as a supplement
to the Army’s ongoing efforts to transform its business operations through
36. Defense Business Transformation Agency, FAQ: BEA; available from: http://www.dod.mil/dbt/
faq_bea.html: accessed 12 March 2007.
37. Francis and Walther, p. 110.
38. Carlos Pair, ‘‘Department of Defense Business Transformation: It’s on A Roll,’’ Armed Force
Comptroller 52, no. 1 (2007): 17–19.
39. Defense Business Board, Mission Statement; available from: http://www.dod.mil/dbb/mission.html:
accessed 28 February 2007.
40. Pair (2007).
41. Department of the Army, About Continuous Process Improvement; available from: http://
www.army.mil/ArmyBTKC/focus/cpi/index.htm: accessed 31 July 2006.
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initiatives such as Personnel Transformation, BMMP, Portfolio Management of
Business Information Systems, Balanced Scorecard, Logistics Transformation,
and Institutional Army Adaptation.42
 The Air Force intends to create new processes through its Smart Ops 21 program,
the implementation of which was catalyzed by the Air Force’s mandate to reduce
its force by approximately 40,000 active duty personnel. Smart Ops 21
encompasses the tools of Lean, Six Sigma, and Theory of Constraints.43
 The goal of the Navy’s Sea Enterprise initiative is to reduce costs in order to
provide internally generated resources for reinvestment and recapitalization.44 Sea
Enterprise has identified three imperatives: change the culture, improve processes
and structures, and harvest savings.45 The Navy is also undertaking a challenging
enterprise realignment to create a more matrixed organization and to create a
culture of enterprise-wide thinking.
Thus, current management initiatives are part of a continuum of change, albeit
influenced by the shape of current forces acting upon it. This continuous change model
has recurring themes of process improvement, cost management, cost reduction,
organizational streamlining, culture change, and adoption of best practices from the
private sector.46
The current management reform agenda does have one possible defining distinction,
however, which is its explicit focus on generating internal savings, through effective cost
management, to support investment and recapitalization for the operating forces. This
idea of cost savings to fund departmental needs is not new of course. But the explicit
nature of the rhetoric of current reform initiativesFsuggesting that the principal reason
for seeking savings is for recapitalization and that savings will be applied to reinvestment
and recapitalizationFstands out. This vision has been much more explicit than in past
reform efforts. It provides a measurable objective, and it aligns with the core values and
mission of the organization. If defense budgets are poised to decline, then what has been
learned in prior periods of budget retrenchment that could inform the current
management agenda?
42. Secretary of the Army, Memorandum: Management Oversight of the Army’s Business
Transformation Initiatives; available from: https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32338: ac-
cessed 31 July 2006.
43. T.C. Lopez, ‘‘Smart Operations Office Formed at Pentagon,’’ Air Force Print News, 11 May 2005.
44. Vernon Clark, ‘‘Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,’’ Naval Institute Proceedings
12, no. 10 (2002): 32–41.
45. For a more thorough description of current reform efforts, see Richard L. Dawe and L. R. Jones,
‘‘Transformation of National Defense Business Management: Current Initiatives and Future Challenges,’’
International Public Management Review 6, no. 2: 9–70; and Department of Defense, Status of the
Department of Defense’s Business Transformation Efforts: Annual Report to the Congressional Defense
Committees (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006).
46. Richard L. Dawe and L. R. Jones, ‘‘Transformation of National Defense Business Management:
Current Initiatives and Future Challenges,’’ International Public Management Review 6, no. 2 (2005): 9–70.
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Management during Retrenchment
Charles Levine framed the decline of government organizations as a symptom of
resource scarcity, a problem for managers who must maintain organizational capacity,
and a contingency for employees and stakeholder groups.47 He focused on the managers’
problem by first acknowledging that most managers, accustomed to growth and
believing that growth is essential, initially confront cutbacks as minor decrements, and
do not take them seriously. These same managers were effective in growth periods
because the presence of slack resources permitted (a) deliberative planning and decision-
making tasks (which, at the time, are largely unused luxuries because resources are
relatively abundant), (b) consensus building among conflicting stakeholders, and (c)
insurance against the risks of innovation by the agency. When the slack was gone,
planning became more essential but was often reduced in the cutback, pluralism among
stakeholders increased along with conflict between them, and innovations were forsaken
as extravagances. Decrement management reduced the likelihood of innovation and
reinforced the status quo.48
In periods of decline, because there are winners and losers, and more of the latter,
resistance is expected from both internal and external stakeholder groups. Managing
during a period of decline is difficult, and problems are common. In a comprehensive
study of the organizational decline literature, the attributes of dysfunctional decline
include those noted above plus:
 the intensification of conflict over increasingly constrained resources leads to
suboptimal across-the-board cuts in lieu of prioritized ones in an effort to
ameliorate that conflict,
 morale among organizational members fell in the face of tighter resources and
increased conflict,
 organizational flexibility declined as decision-making was centralized,
 organizational leaders were marked as scapegoats for the frustration felt by
organization members, resulting in the loss of leaders’ credibility and increased
turnover, and
 disproportionate attention was paid to short-term crisis response supplanting
long-term planning.49
DoD is not immune from these risk factors. Sustaining defense business management
reform may therefore be at risk during a time of budget constraint.
47. Charles H. Levine, ‘‘Organizational Decline and Cutback Management,’’ Public Administration
Review 38, no. 4 (1978): 316–325.
48. Andrew Glassberg, ‘‘Organizational Responses to Municipal Budget Decreases,’’ Public Adminis-
tration Review 38, no. 4 (1978): 325–332.
49. Kim S. Cameron, David A. Whetten, and Myung U. Kim, ‘‘Organizational Dysfunctions of
Decline,’’ The Academy of Management Journal 30, no. 1 (1987): 126–138.
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Management Reform at Risk?
The current defense management reform agenda is driven by three factors: (a) to align
changed business practices with force transformation characterized by agility and speed;
(b) to generate resources internally to support recapitalization and investment in future
combat systems; and (c) to reduce internal pressures on the defense budget and respond
to external pressures on the defense budget. If these imperatives are as strong as they
appear, what then could undermine the current reform effort and make it unsustainable?
There are four clear possibilities.
(1) War costs. If operations in Iraq and Afghanistan persist, costs associated with the
base defense budget and the war effort will continue to diverge, particularly if war
funding continues to be carried out through nontradition budget ‘‘bridges’’ and
supplemental appropriations, a pattern unseen in the budgeting for past wars.50 In
this case, management associated with the base budget will operate in an
increasingly constrained environment, while unconstrained spending will continue
to be associated with the war. This is hardly an environment that will drive culture
change and cost management throughout the organization. Moreover, these
conditions invite the migration of base budget functions to the less constrained,
and less cost managed, war budget, resulting in distortions in the base budget that
will affect future budget decisions. As noted in the fiscal year 2008 aircraft
procurement budgets, this process has already begun.
(2) Losing the vision. Alternatively, Congress could demand that appropriations for
the war efforts migrate to the base budget. In that case, it is likely that total
defense resources will erode as they are combined and become more transparent.
Thus follows the second possibility: losing the reform vision to current-year
‘‘budget drills’’ to meet unfunded needs or budget ‘‘wedges’’ in the execution year.
Successful reforms may depend on demonstrating that the cost reductions and
management reforms have generated the desired savings and that the savings have
been applied to the stated objective. Failure to sustain or account for the results can
lead to a loss of credibility for senior leaders.51 If budget reductions cause the
recapitalization goals to disappear in favor of simply meeting reduced budget
targets, much of the motivation for reform could be lost to ‘‘business as usual’’
and even supportive middle managers will likely retreat to traditional use-or-lose
resource hoarding tactics.
(3) Change fatigue. ‘‘Repetitive Change Syndrome’’ is experienced when organiza-
tions adopt change initiatives too frequently. Such frequency generates chaos,
50. Congressional Research Service, Military Operations: Precedents for Funding Contingency
Operations in Regular or in Supplemental Appropriations Bills (Report RS22455) (Washington, DC, 2006).
51. Michael A. Roberto and Lynne C. Levesque, ‘‘The Art of Making Change Initiatives Stick,’’ Sloan
Management Review 46, no. 4 (2005): 53–60.
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burnout, and incapacity to make further change, thus, harming daily operations.52
Observers warn against adopting change initiatives too frequently.53 The short
history above shows that defense management reform has been a continuous
theme for over 20 years. Sustaining transformation could now depend on learning
more about how the organization perceives the change agenda through analysis of
communications and feedback and by examining the knowledge, attitudes, and
actions of the receptors of communications about transformation.
(4) Leadership change. Leaders change frequently in the DoD among both the
uniformed and senior civilian ranks. It often appears that management reform
initiatives do not survive leadership transitions, notwithstanding the success or
failure of any particular reform initiative. Former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s
reforms to the budgeting system explicitly acknowledge political leadership
cycles.54 The current administration is in its final two years; sustaining its
management agenda beyond the election horizons may not be a high priority. A
new management agenda will replace the current ‘‘transformation’’ agenda,
although the new administration will almost certainly face the same challenges to
find more efficient defense business management practices and seek reinvestable
cost savings from these efficiencies. Will new leaders reinvent management reform
to conform to their views of defense management? How much priority will be
given to management, especially if budgets decline and management reform
requires investing in the short run to achieve longer-term savings. Learning to
institutionalize the principles and processes of management reform will be
important to future leadership transitions. For instance, Comptroller General
David Walker has proposed the creation of a chief management officer position
for DoD.55 Presumably, such an office could serve to perpetuate management
improvement initiatives through transitions. Another possibility might be to
combine the current governance structure into an organization that could both
manage current reform and explore potential future reforms. We recommend a
research and education project to facilitate the continuation of improvements in
defense business management practices through the expected leadership transition
of 2008–2009.
52. Eric Abrahamson, ‘‘Avoiding Repetitive Change Syndrome,’’ Sloan Management Review 45, no.2
(2004): 93–95.
53. Ibid.
54. L. R. Jones and Jerry L. McCaffery, ‘‘Reform of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System,
and Management Control in the U.S. Department of Defense: Insights from Budget Theory,’’ Public
Budgeting & Finance 25, no. 3 (2005): 1–19.
55. Government Accountability Office, Defense Business Transformation: A Comprehensive Plan,
Integrated Efforts, and Sustained Leadership Are Needed to Assure Success. Testimony by David Walker
before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services
(Washington, DC: GAO-07-208T, 2006).
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Management Reform in a Declining Budget
How then should management reform be considered, if budgets are likely to decline and
significant organizational risk factors threaten continuation of defense business
management reform initiatives? We offer three propositions.
Efficiency-seeking management reforms will be insufficient to make up the budget
shortfall. Claimed cost savings can be initially impressive. For instance, the Naval
Air Systems Command claims FY 2007 savings to date amounting to $13.9 million
composed of permanent cost reductions ($6.1 million) and potential cost reductions
from improved practices ($7.8 million).56 Overall, the Navy’s business transforma-
tion advocate claims combined savings from Sea Enterprise initiatives of $27.7
billion from FY 2003 through 2005.57 In both cases, some of the savings are realized
in current-year operations and are more the result of projected cost reductions and
revised future spending requirements. Nevertheless, these savings are not likely to
close the type and magnitude of budget gap suggested by the foregoing analysis. As
Barzelay and Thompson noted in an Air Force case study, ‘‘better cost management
systems do not guarantee more effective cost management.’’58 Even if efficiency-
seeking savings reduce a significant portion of the internally generated fiscal stress,
cost-reduction measures through management initiatives will not close the entire
fiscal gap because they only address the internal sources of stress. The external
sources are untouched by efficiency savings, except for those few stakeholders who
define effectiveness in terms of achieving efficiency. Moreover, cost reductions are
dispersed throughout the organization, are difficult to harvest, and are likely to be
hoarded by middle managers in the face of tight resources. Savings in current year
budgets are likely to be redirected to supposedly underfunded current requirements.
Even if DoD’s cost accounting systems could aggregate total savings, the amount of
savings would not likely be sufficient to close a budget shortfall. Indeed, initiated
solely, efficiency-seeking measures may aggravate the negative effects of retrench-
ment.
Good management does not attract resources. There is little evidence to suggest that
good management is rewarded with larger budgets. Resource allocation decisions
are policy choices among competing demands. Good management reduces the
demand and may lead to reduced marginal future resource bases. Even the
movement toward performance budgeting in the federal government leaves unclear
the link between performance and resource allocation. Budgets simply do not grow
because an agency gets a clean audit opinion or re-engineers business practices.
56. Department of the Navy, Naval Air Systems Command AIRSPeed Home Page; available from:
http://www.navair.navy.mil/navairairspeed/Accessed: accessed 28 February 2007.
57. Justin D. McCarthy, ‘‘The Case for Transformation.’’ Presentation given to the Navy Corporate
Business Course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 7 February 2006.
58. Michael Barzelay and Fred Thompson, ‘‘Responsibility Budgeting at the Air Force Materiel
Command,’’ Public Administration Review 66, no. 1 (2006): 135.
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If efficiency-seeking business management reform cannot be viewed as a solution to
declining defense budgets, how should DoD view the rationale for sustaining
management reform initiatives? There are two strong imperatives for sustaining an
effective management reform agenda.
Continuous efficiency-seeking management improvement in DoD should be understood
as driven by stewardship concerns and the requirements of the operating forces. The
DoD has the responsibility to the president, the Congress, and the public to be a
good steward of the highly material portion of the federal budget it manages. There
is a justified expectation that the DoD will manage its resources well. DoD also has
a responsibility to support efficiently the varied requirements of the operating
forces: people, systems, weapons, material. The policies and processes of manage-
ment reform must align with operational requirements, especially as force
transformation increases pressure on the business side of the department.
Large budget reductions can only be met by truly transformational responses. Despite
the rhetoric of ‘‘transformation,’’ the history of management reform in DoD has
been a model of incremental continuous change. A large decline in the defense top
line can only be met by transformational changes that take both functions and costs
out of the department permanently. Major productivity improvements through
consolidations, divestiture of both functions and assets, canceled programs, and
sharply reduced personnel would have to be achieved.
The matter of sustaining management reform in a time of declining budgets can be
approached as two questions, not one. What are the best budget policy decisions
regarding resource levels and allocation considering the salient internal and external
factors? And how much and what type of management reform is needed to meet the
standards of stewardship and to support the requirements of the operating forces?
CONCLUSION
We have looked at business management reform in the DoD and see that it has been a
continuous incremental process since at least the Reagan administration. Common
themes have permeated each administration, although labels attached to the agendas
have changed. Foremost among them is the efficient use of resources, whether they are
capital, human, or financial assets, by increasing productivity and reducing costs.59 No
single initiative will clearly persist; likewise, changing conditions could interrupt the
current management reform agenda. We have also examined the question of declining
budgets. It is evident that pressure on the defense top line comes from external sources as
well as internal factors, regardless of how one defines the top line. We have also
investigated themes in managing downturns. From this analysis, we have argued that
59. Francis and Walther, p. 125.
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efficiency-seeking management reforms can only address the internal pressures on the
defense top line. We have identified specific threats to sustaining defense management
reform in a time of declining budgets and have offered strategic propositions to consider
when addressing management reform in a time of declining budgets. This paper
contributes to the defense management reform literature by challenging the current
reform emphasis of attempting to solve a looming budget problem through efficiency-
seeking measures. We have concluded that management reform alone is insufficient to
close the funding gap that exists and that may worsen from declining defense budgets.
Budget reductions, if they come, must be met by large-scale change in the department.
Better management, on the other hand, should instead be viewed by defense leaders as
imperative for reasons of stewardship and support for the operating forces.
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